

January 3, 1976

MEMORANDUM

FOR: The President

FROM: George Bush *GB*

SUBJECT: Suggestions for Presidential Directive to the  
new Director-CIA

Since our last conversation I have had many intelligence briefings and I have read the various reform proposals that have been submitted to you, along with some that weren't submitted.

I have not felt free to attend official coordinating meetings, not wanting to put any pressure on Bill Colby who has been extraordinarily thoughtful to me. I do want, however, to give you some of my personal views, before any final decisions are made -- decisions that clearly affect the conduct of my new job.

I have prepared twelve recommendations that you might want to include in a "letter of instruction" to the new Director of Intelligence. These recommendations do not require legislation. The list is not intended to be all-inclusive.

I have gone over these with Mike Duval and have talked to Bill Colby on many of them. I have not shown this to Jack Marsh who is out of town today, but he has encouraged me to send my views directly to you.

A personal note: I am told that the Senate is going to act on my nomination soon after it comes back. Barbara and I plan to go to the Bahamas for one week commencing January 7th. Before that and after I will be in my EOB office. I hope you and I will have a chance to visit in person before any final decisions are made. Hopefully, this could be done immediately upon my confirmation.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

A. I hope whatever is done will not be too defensive. In my view the general theme should be:

Intelligence is vital to our country. We are making proposals to strengthen it and improve it. The President will see that abuses are eliminated and he will guarantee that we will maintain and strengthen our vital foreign intelligence capability.

B. I think you should move immediately to take certain steps that do not require legislation. This can best be done by a letter to the new Director along the lines of your previous letter to Bill Colby. It can be done at the same time as you propose legislative changes, but in any event it should be done shortly after I take office.

C. My specific twelve points follow.

Point 1.

The DCI will have access to all intelligence information. None shall be withheld from him, and when he asks for any information from any department it will be granted to him. The Director will take the appropriate steps to guarantee that information provided him is kept. secret.

Comment:

This instruction is essential as a guarantee that no Department withholds vital information from the Director. I recognize the sensitivity of high level policy discussions with foreign leaders, for example, but unless the Director has access to all intelligence the estimates presented to the President are not as good as they might be. Procedures can be initiated to guard against leaks; but, in the final analysis, if I am to do this job well, I must have your confidence and that confidence must be expressed through instructions to all concerned to make available to me any information that I request. I feel the same way about so called "series checks" which are indeed intelligence. I recognize that some information is so sensitive that I will have to hold it in my own personal office, but the principle must be established that the Director has access to all information.

Point 2.

The Director will have direct access to the President. The President instructs the Director to give him objective and independent intelligence without regard to any foreign policy considerations. The President expects the Director to work closely with the NSC, but the President wants it understood that the Director will have direct access to the President when he feels such access is necessary.

Comment:

You and I have discussed this. Having it stated publicly will make my job much easier in the Intelligence Community and will allay fears on the Hill and elsewhere about the information being too filtered when it reaches the President. I believe our agreement on regularly-scheduled meetings should be made public.

Point 3.

The Director will be given Cabinet rank, but he will not attend Cabinet meetings unless they relate to foreign affairs.

Comment:

Cabinet rank bestowed by the President will demonstrate the importance the President feels about intelligence; but I should not attend Cabinet meetings unless the agenda is foreign affairs. You would get enormous political flak if I did. The Cabinet rank, however, would help in dealing with the Deputy Secretaries and the Secretaries at State and Defense particularly. It is more form than substance but Colby made the original recommendation and I support it.

**Point 4.**

The President reiterates his support for the Director as his top intelligence officer and instructs him to meet from time to time with the Secretaries of State and Defense as well as the head of the NSC in order to insure the President of maximum cooperation between the producers and the users of intelligence.

**Comment:**

Maximum cooperation between the Secretaries of State and Defense with the DCI is essential to an efficient intelligence system.

Point 5.

The President plans to appoint an additional Deputy for CIA. He instructs the Director to have one Deputy concern himself with managing the agency under the direction of the Director. The other Deputy would concern himself primarily with coordination of the Intelligence Community for the Director.

Comment:

This was a recommendation of the Rockefeller Commission that has wide spread support in the Community and on the Hill. I am told it can be initiated without Hill action but legislation will be required eventually because of the "advise and consent" provision. The concept makes sound management sense to me.

Point 6.

The President instructs the Director to renew his efforts in the resource field for the entire community. The President will look to the Director for maximum effort to eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication regarding resources of both money and manpower. The Department of Defense is instructed to provide the Director with maximum cooperation in this regard.

Comment:

Various proposals have been presented to you for strengthening the Director's role in resource control. I have avoided here the many specific recommendations on reorganization affecting control of resources. I am convinced that the Director needs more than this supportive language if he is going to really be a constructive influence in controlling resources. Language such as this Point 6 will help, however. It is my intention, of course, to be in close touch with Jim Lynn on resource control after confirmation.



Point 7.

The Director will not have as priority the tactical intelligence field. Tactical intelligence has been and should continue to be the priority concern of defense intelligence. The Director shall be alert to eliminate wasteful duplication in the entire Intelligence Community, however.

Comment:

Tactical intelligence really belongs to the military. By down playing the DCI's role in tactical intelligence you help eliminate a long standing irritant between DOD and CIA. The Director can keep his eye on the "big picture" but language such as suggested in Point 7 will be well received by Defense yet needn't result in escalated overall intelligence costs. It simply gives the Director guidance on priorities.

Point 8.

The Director should give immediate attention to housing his Intelligence Community Staff in a location separate from CIA Headquarters at Langley.

Comment:

This move will be well received by non-CIA elements in the Intelligence Community, many of whom over the years have questioned the Director's objectivity. There is a CIA building on E Street that could probably be used. This move has Bill Colby's support. Mike Duval and I have discussed locating the Director and some of his Community Staff (when the DCI is not in his Langley office) in the EOB. I oppose this, feeling that you will be accused of making the Intelligence Community political or getting it too close to "policy." My own political past argues for location other than in EOB.

There have been suggestions that in order to increase the Director's appearance of objectivity, the DCI should have no operational control over CIA. I strongly oppose these suggestions. I strongly oppose removing the Director from his Langley office and separating him from his only power base -- the CIA itself. I do support having the Community Staff in a separate location from the CIA itself.

Point 9.

The Director is instructed to give maximum attention to cooperating with Congress. Where there undoubtedly will be some matters of difference between the Executive and the Legislative Branches and the Director is expected to follow Presidential directives to the letter when disputes arise, the Director is instructed to work closely with the appropriate authorities in Congress on matters relating to national intelligence.

Comment:

Some language is necessary to reassure Congress. If such language is omitted, that in my view would make the news.

Point 10.

The Director is instructed to make a thorough review of all CIA instructions that have been issued over the years regarding guidelines for proper conduct of intelligence matters. He should take any additional reform steps that he deems necessary. Many reforms have already been implemented by Director Colby, but the President wants direct assurance from the new Director that he has done everything in his power to guard against the abuses that have damaged the Intelligence Community.

Comment:

Though I don't want to see your letter or your non-legislative instructions dwell on sins of the past you would be attacked unless some "correction of abuse" language is involved. This paragraph should not be read as an appeal for no executive order restricting intelligence community activities. Indeed from your standpoint, I can see the essentiality of some type executive order. I do feel that many of the necessary corrective steps at CIA have already been taken.

Point 11.

The Director working closely with the NSC, is instructed to take the initiative in finding more satisfactory "cover" arrangements for CIA personnel operating abroad. Appropriate departments of government are instructed to give full co-operation to the Director.

Comment:

I put this in here because of the recent Welch killing and because there is an increasing problem in providing decent cover for CIA agents abroad. [REDACTED]

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Welch's death makes this inclusion timely.

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Point 12.

**Covert Action.** The President instructs the Director that no covert action be initiated without signed formal approval of the 40 Committee and direct Presidential instruction.

**Comment:**

I include this paragraph on covert simply because it is on the minds of so many people. I have proposed nothing new here -- simply a reiteration of the status quo. My own gut instinct is to minimize our use of covert action, saving it for clearly important operations. If you agree a sentence on this would be well received by the critics. This approach is far better than requesting legislation which would lock you and future Presidents into a process which might in the future prove inadequate.